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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LYNDA SMITH,
Case No. 930162-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR. ,

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to decide this appeal is conferred on the Utah
Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err when it found that the home at

1098 South Fir Street, Cedar City, Utah, titled in Defendant's
name, was a marital asset, where the down payment for purchase of
the home was made with the proceeds of the sale of the Defendant's
premarital home and the mortgage payments had been paid with
Defendant's

segregated premarital retirement benefits, in the

absence of evidence that the Plaintiff had, by her efforts,
augmented, maintained, or protected that property, except to reside
there?

The standard for review of a trial court's factual findings is
the "clearly erroneous" standard.

Haqan v. Hagan/ 810 P.2d 478,

481 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered

that the home at 1098 South Fir Street in Cedar City, Utah, be sold
and the proceeds divided equally between the parties, and granted
Plaintiff possession of the home pending sale, in light of the
Defendant having paid the down payment and the monthly mortgage
payments to purchase the home with his separate funds?
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382, (Utah 1980).
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered
that the 1988 Jaguar automobile be sold and the proceeds divided
equally between the parties despite the Defendant's claim to a
premarital interest in that automobile?
As to the Court's factual finding concerning the Defendant's
claim to a pre-marital interest in the 1988 Jaguar automobile, the
"clearly erroneous" standard for review of the trial court's
factual findings would apply.
(Ut.

Ct. App. 1991).

Haqan v. Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481

As to the Court's decision regarding

disposition of that asset, the "clear abuse of discretion" standard
of review would apply, as set forth in Kerr v. Kerr, 610, P.2d
1380, 1382, (Utah, 1980).
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused

to include a portion of the value of the Plaintiff's Porsche
automobile in the marital estate where the automobile had been
2

substantially repaired and refurbished during the marriage, thereby
significantly enhancing its value?
As to the Court's factual finding concerning the Defendant's
claim to a marital interest in the Porsche automobile, the "clearly
erroneous"

standard

findings would apply.
App. 1991).

for review of the Trial Court's factual
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Ut. Ct.

As to the Court's decision regarding disposition of

that asset, the "clear abuse of discretion" standard of review
would apply as set forth in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Ut.
1980) .
5. Should the Defendant's 401K and salaried savings plan have
been valued as of the date of trial or, alternatively, as of the
date of the parties' separation where the Defendant's earnings,
from which post separation contributions to the plan were made,
were all from employment in the state of California and the State
of California has provided by statute that post separation earnings
are the separate property of the party who earns the income?
Since this issue involves a question of law, the standard of
appellate review is a "correction of error" standard, giving no
deference to the trial court.

Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403

(Ut. Ct. App. 1990) .
6.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered

that the Blazer automobile be sold and the proceeds divided equally
between the parties although the value of the Blazer automobile at
the time of trial was substantially less than the value at the time
of separation as a result of damage to the vehicle and repairs
3

required because Plaintiff's son had used or abused the vehicle
during the parties' separation?
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in
Kerrey. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382, (Utah 1980)
7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to
order the Plaintiff to repay to the marital estate money she had
withdrawn from the parties' joint business in violation of a Court
order prohibiting her from doing so?
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in
Kerr v. Kerr, 610, P.2d 1380, 1382, (Ut. 1980).
8.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused

to order the Plaintiff to compensate Defendant for damage to his
fire arms caused by her son while the property was left in her
possession during the pendency of the proceedings?
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1381, (Ut. 1980).
9.

Should the trial court have included, as an asset of the

marriage which should be awarded to the Plaintiff, a child support
receivable which the Plaintiff had accumulated during the parties'
marriage where the Defendant provided nearly all of the support for
Plaintiff's child during the parties' marriage?
Since this issue involves a question of law, the standard of
appellate review is a "correction of error" standard, giving no
4

deference to the trial court.

Maxwell v. Maxwell/ 796 P.2d 403

(Ut. Ct. App. 1990) .
11.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused

to order that the credit card debt incurred for the Defendant's
travel

expenses

prior

to

the

parties'

separation,

which

had

historically been considered a debt of the parties' joint business,
be paid from income generated by the business or with the proceeds
of sale of that business?
The applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of
this issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382, (Ut. 1980).
12.
contempt

Is the trial

court's

finding the Defendant was

for failure to pay one-half

in

of a tax refund to the

Plaintiff supported by the evidence where Defendant withheld paying
the money directly to Plaintiff because he was waiting for a ruling
from the Court on his claim that the credit card debt for travel
expenses should be paid as a business debt and the Court had
earlier issued an order that the tax refund be used to pay business
debts?
As to the Court's factual findings with reference to this
issue, the "clearly erroneous" standard of review would apply.
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
California Civil Code §5118.
The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and minor
children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse,
5

while living separate and apart from the other spouse,
are the separate property of the spouse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.

This case is before the Court on appeal from a Decree of
Divorce and Orders entered following a hearing on motions filed
pursuant to Rule 52(b) and Rule 59 of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Complaint for Divorce was filed on or about May 5, 1992.
(Record at 2) At a hearing held on May 21, 1992, certain orders
were rendered by the Domestic Court Commissioner. (Record at 42)
Motions were filed by each party since that time to modify or
enforce those orders. (Record at 46-48, 78-83, 128-130, 135-146)
On

August

12,

1992,

the

Conference. (Record at 63-64)

Defendant

requested

a

Scheduling

The matter was then set for trial

and the trial was held on December 3, 4, and 10, 1992. (Record at
268-274) Following the trial the Court announced its Findings and
Decree. A motion to supplement the Findings and Order and a Motion
for Rehearing on certain issues was filed by the Defendant on
January 13, 1993. (Record at 283-287, 290-292)

All pending post

trial motions were then set for hearing, on February 25, 1993.
However, prior to that hearing on February 9, 1993, the trial court
had signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Decree
of Divorce was signed and the Findings and Decree were entered on
February 19, 1993.

(Record at 359-382) On March 31, 1993, the

Court signed its Order disposing of the pending post trial motions
6

and that Order was entered on or about April 1, 1993. (Record at
406-411)

On March 16, 1993, the Defendant filed a Notice of

Appeal, after the Court had entered its decision on the post trial
motions but before Defendant had received the Court's Order
disposing of those motions. (Record at 392-393)

Contemporaneous

with the filing of the Docketing Statement in this proceeding, the
Defendant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal with the trial court
seeking review of the Court's Order disposing of the post trial
motions as well as review of the Court's initial Findings and
Decree. (Record at 474-475)
B.
1.

Statement of Facts.
The parties to this action were married in Las Vegas

Nevada, on August 17, 1985. (Record at 2; (1Transcript of trial at
485) This was the second marriage for each party. (T. at 85 and
417)
2. At the time of the parties' marriage, the Defendant owned
a furnished home in Mission Hills, California, in which he had
substantial

eguity,

(T. at 488-489) and substantial personal

property including automobiles, a boat, etc. (T. at 489-496, 501507) In addition, the Defendant had savings and checking accounts
and two IRA accounts. (T. at 483-486)

The Defendant retired from

the Air Force in 1983 and had been receiving monthly income as a
result of a fully vested retirement benefit prior to the time he
married

Plaintiff.

(T. at 487)

1

The Defendant

had obtained

Transcript of the trial held December 3, 4, and 10, 1992,
will hereafter be referred to by the title "T" followed by the page
number of the transcript to which reference is made.
7

employment as an engineer with Lockheed Advanced

Development

Company in the State of California on April 2, 1985. (T. at 482)
3. At the time of the parties' marriage, the Plaintiff owned
a 1969 Porsche automobile (T. at 179), in need of repair, (T. at
638) and a waterbed, portable 19" TV, some clothing and one dresser
drawers. (T. at 508)

Plaintiff was also the beneficiary of two

trust deeds totaling approximately $70,000.00, secured by a home
awarded to a former husband in a prior divorce proceeding (T. at
533) and she owned a one-half interest in Johnny's Auto.

(T. at

934) The notes were in default (T. at 341) and she never realized
anything as a result of her interest in that business, in part
because of her exhusband's bankruptcy. (T. a 534-535)
4.

Following the parties' marriage, the Defendant supported

the Plaintiff and her minor son, who resided with the parties until
their separation in May of 1993. (T. at 379)

The Plaintiff's

former husband paid only $150.00 of the $800.00 per month in child
support he was ordered to pay during that period of time (T. at 381
and 200) leaving a receivable, for the approximately 80 1/2 months
the parties resided together, of approximately $64,250.00.
5.

After the parties' marriage, the Defendant assisted the

Plaintiff in efforts to foreclose her lien on the home awarded to
the Plaintiff's former husband. (T at 369 and 535)
former husband then filed bankruptcy.

Plaintiff's

(T at 535 and 630) In order

to avoid foreclosure sale of the property by a prior lien holder,
Defendant paid the first mortgage payments due on the home and,
after the parties had moved to Utah and Plaintiff was residing
8

there full time, Defendant continued to pursue legal remedies in
order to obtain a release of that property from the bankruptcy and
ultimately foreclose same. (T at 537,583, and 633)

Defendant

expended substantial time and financial resources in that effort
and to improve the property. These efforts ultimately proved
successful. (T at 583-584 and 585) During the course of these
efforts, the Plaintiff deeded the property to the Defendant and the
property was then sold. (T at 586) The proceeds of sale were used
to pay existing debt and to pay a down payment to purchase the
Sportsmen's Lounge, a business located in Cedar City, Utah, and the
real property on which that property is located. (T at 583 and 587588)
6.

After the parties moved

Sportsmen' Lounge, Defendant

to Utah

continued

and acquired the

to work

at Lockheed,

commuting between California and Utah. (T at 593)

Defendant

continued to maintain his residence in the state of Utah but he
also had a room in California where he would sleep on week nights.
(T at 619) Initially Defendant commuted by car. (T at 633) However,
eventually Defendant obtained a pilot's license and purchased an
airplane so that he could reduce the time involved in that commute.
(T at 634)

He then began commuting twice each week as weather

would permit; he spent three or four days each week in California.
(T at 636)
7.

After the parties' marriage, Defendant sold his home in

Mission Hills, California, and used the equity realized upon the
sale to, among other things, pay the $37,000.00 down payment on a
9

home purchased in Cedar City, Utah, at 1098 South Fir Street, and
purchased a $5,000,00 Jacuzzi for the home. (T at 518-519)

When

that home was purchased, it was titled in the Defendant' name alone
and Defendant signed the Promissory Note. (T at 82 and 528)
However, for reasons which were not explained at trial, Plaintiff's
name appears as a joint obligor on the Trust Deed securing the
balance of the purchase price and a rider to the note.

(T at 35-

38) At trial Defendant maintained that Plaintiff had affirmatively
waived any interest in that residence when it was purchased.

(T at

550) Plaintiff denies that she had done so and maintained that she
was a co-owner of the property although her name did not appear on
title. (T at 46) All mortgage payments for the home at 1098 South
Fir

Street

were made

with

the proceeds

of

the

Defendant's

premarital Air Force retirement account which he maintained in a
segregated bank account over which the Plaintiff had no signature
rights or control. (T at 601-602)
8. Following the parties' separation, Defendant continued to
stay at the room he had rented in California and the Plaintiff was
awarded possession of the residence at 1098 South Fir Street in
Cedar City, Utah. (Record at 42) Defendant was ordered to pay
Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 per month as temporary support and
he did so until trial.
Court's

Order

that

(Record at 42) In conjunction with the

Defendant

pay

temporary

support

to

the

Plaintiff, the Court also ordered that the Plaintiff continue to
manage the Sportsmen's Lounge but that she account to the Court for
all activities with reference to the Lounge and that she "draw no
10

funds from the business." (Record at 42) In August of 1992, without
the Defendant's knowledge or the Court's permission, the Defendant
began paying herself a salary of $1,000.00 per month from the
Sportsmen's Lounge. (T at 362 and 420) From that time until the
date of trial the Plaintiff received $1,000.00 per month from the
Lounge, plus

$1,000.00 per month temporary

support

from the

Defendant. (T at 362 and 193)
9.

At the time of the parties' separation, Defendant had a

401K and salaried savings plan with his employer. (T at 568) The
Defendant continued to contribute to that salaried savings plan and
401K after the separation. (T at 573) All of the income earned from
Defendant's employment from which those contributions were made was
earned in the State of California. (T at 569-570)
10.

At the time of the parties' separation there was an

outstanding credit card debt that had been incurred for travel
expenses associated with the Defendant's use of the airplane in
commuting to work

from the state of Utah in the amount of

approximately $4,882.00.

(T at 592-593) That credit card debt had

been historically considered a debt of the Sportsmen's Lounge and
had been paid as an operating expense of the Sportsmen's Lounge. (T
at 370-371) The Trial Court's initial Findings and Decree did not
address allocation of that debt although Defendant asked that it be
taxed as an obligation of the Sportsmen's Lounge.
11.

Early on in the proceedings, the Court through the

Domestic Court Commissioner had directed that an income tax refund
in the Defendant's possession be "used for business expenses".
11

(Record at 42) The Defendant had used a portion of that tax refund
to pay accounting fees and airport hanger fees. (T at 594) The
balance he held in his checking account during the pendency of the
proceedings because of some inconsistency regarding the Court's
treatment of the travel expense debt that remained outstanding. (T
at 651)
12.

Following trial, the Court ruled that the home at 1098

South Fir Street was a marital asset and refused to award the
Defendant any premarital or separate property interest in the same.
(Record at 369)

The Court ordered that the home be sold and the

proceeds divided egually between the parties. (Record at 370)
Pending sale the Plaintiff was granted possession of the home and
ordered to make the payment on the first mortgage. (Record at 370)
13.

The Court valued all assets as of the date of trial,

including the salaried savings plan into which Defendant had
continued to make contributions from his earnings following the
parties' separation. (T at 371)
14.

In its Decree of Divorce, the Court, for the most part,

returned to each party his or her premarital property, except the
1988 Jaguar, and directed that certain items of personal property
be

sold,

including

substantial

the

airplane, against

indebtedness,

the

Blazer

which

there

automobile,

is a

left

in

Plaintiff's possession which had been damaged while in the
possession of the Plaintiff and her son, the motor home, and the
1988 Jaguar automobile in which the Defendant claimed a premarital
property interest. (Record at 379)
12

The Court ordered that the

proceeds of sale of those items be divided equally between the
parties. (Record at 379)
15. The Court ruled that Plaintiff's child support receivable
due from her former spouse for the child Defendant had supported
during the marriage of these parties was not an asset which should
be considered in the Court's division of property.

(Record at 363)

The Court also ruled that, despite both parties' acknowledgement
that the value of the Plaintiff's premarital Porsche automobile had
been substantially enhanced through repairs and refurbishing during
the marriage, that the marital estate had no interest in that
asset. (Record at 365)
16. In its Decree of Divorce, the Court did not rule on the
Defendant's request that the Plaintiff repay the salary which she
had drawn from the Sportsmen's Lounge in violation of the Court's
previous Order and declined to find her in contempt by having done
so in essence denying Defendant's request in that regard. (Record
at 375-382)
17.

Certain issues which had not been addressed by the Court

in the Decree of Divorce were the subject of a Motion to Supplement
Findings. (Record at 283-287) Following a hearing on that Motion,
the Court declined to award to the Defendant anything for damage to
his fire arms caused by the Plaintiff's child while the fire arms
were

left

in

her

possession

during

the

pendency

of

these

proceedings, denied Defendant's request that the credit card debt
for travel expenses incurred prior to the parties' separation,
traditionally paid by the Sportsmen's Lounge, be considered a
13

marital debt, and held Defendant in contempt for not paying to
Plaintiff one-half of the remaining tax refund although Defendant
maintained that the reason he had not paid Plaintiff her share of
the tax refund as ordered by the Court, was because of the pending
Motions relating to allocation of the credit card debt. (Record at
406-411)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this case the trial court was faced with, among other
things, the responsibility to determine whether certain assets were
the separate property of either party or marital assets and then
equitably divide the property available.

The trial court found

that the Defendant's home at 1098 South Fir Street in Cedar City,
Utah, was a marital asset even though the down payment and all of
the mortgage payments had been made with the Defendant's premarital
pron^rty.

The trial court then ordered that the proceeds of the

sale of the home be divided equally between the parties, ignoring
the fact that the down payment and the reduction in principal on
the outstanding mortgage were paid with the Defendant's separate
property.

The trial court's findings and order in that regard

violate well recognized principles for treatment of premarital
assets

and/or

contribution

of

premarital

acquisition of assets during the marriage.

property

toward

Likewise, the court

failed to recognize the Defendant's premarital interest in the 1988
Jaguar automobile, an asset acquired during the marriage in part
with his premarital assets and failed to recognize a marital
interest in the Plaintiff's Porsche automobile which had been hers
14

prior to the marriage but the value of which had been substantially
enhanced during the marriage through the expenditure of either the
Defendant's separate or the parties' marital funds.
Several of the issues presented for review by the Court of
Appeals involve treatment of assets either acquired with post
separation earnings or held post separation by one of the two
parties pending final hearing.

In the state of Utah, as a general

rule, assets should be valued as of the date of divorce. However,
if a party has dissipated an asset, i.e., has been responsible for
substantially decreasing the value of the asset, then the party who
is responsible for the reduction in value should account to the
marital estate for the dissipation of that asset. Similarly, if an
asset has been substantially increased in value through the efforts
of the party who has exclusive control of that asset, the asset
should be valued as of the parties' separation date. In this case
the Defendant continued to contribute toward his salaried savings
plan

following

the parties' separation

by

contributing post

separation earnings to increase the value of the plan.

Since the

marital partnership had nothing to do with the enhancement of that
asset, separation date is the appropriate date to value that asset.
This is even more clearly the case in this instance where the
earnings which the Defendant contributed to increase the value of
his salaried savings plan after the parties' separation were his
separate property under the law of the jurisdiction where the
earnings were obtained and the salaried savings plan maintained.
Certain

assets, both marital
15

and

Defendant's

premarital

property, were left in the control of the Plaintiff while this
action was pending. The Plaintiff withdrew money from the parties'
jointly owned business in violation of an order rendered by the
Domestic Court Commissioner.

In addition the Plaintiff's son

damaged Defendant's firearms, conceded to be his separate property,
and the parties' Blazer automobile was damaged during the parties'
separation while in Plaintiff's control. Plaintiff should be held
to account for the decrease in value of these items. She should be
ordered to reimburse the marital estate for the marital property
"dissipated" and pay Defendant the amount by which the value of his
separate property had been damaged while in her control.
In this case the trial court failed to consider all of the
assets of the parties. During the parties' marriage the Plaintiff
had accumulated a receivable for unpaid child support against a
former spouse. The Defendant had provided substantially all of the
support for the child for whom Plaintiff was entitled to receive
that child support. That asset is at least as viable a receivable
as any other receivable would be since child support is, in many
respects, a preferred obligation. This receivable should have been
considered an asset of the marriage, awarded to the Plaintiff, and
taken into account when allocating other assets of the marriage to
the parties.
At

the

time

the

parties

were

separated

there

was

an

outstanding debt for travel expenses incurred in conjunction with
the

Defendant's

employment

in

commuting
the

state

between
of

Cedar

California.
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City, Utah
That

and

his

expense

had

historically been paid as a debt of the parties' jointly owned
business.

The Court's determination that the business should not

be responsible to pay that debt but, instead, imposing upon
Defendant the full responsibility to pay that business obligation,
was not equitable, especially in light of the Court's declared
intent to equally divide the equity in the jointly owned business.
At the hearing on February 25, 1993, the Court found the
Defendant in contempt for failure to pay to the Plaintiff one-half
of the tax refund.

However, on May 21, 1992, the Domestic Court

Commissioner had ordered that that refund was to be used for bills
associated with the Lounge.

In light of the Defendant's belief

that the bill for travel expenses was a business debt it is not
unreasonable that the Defendant would have retained those funds
until the Court decided whether the travel expenses should be
considered a business debt and, if so, paid with the income tax
refund. The Defendant's retaining those funds does not constitute
contempt under these circumstances.

ARGUMENT
A.

INCLUDING ONE SPOUSE'S SEPARATE ASSET IN THE MARITAL

ESTATE IS APPROPRIATE IF THAT ASSET HAS BEEN COMMINGLED WITH
MARITAL PROPERTY, CONTRIBUTED TO THE MARITAL ESTATE, OR ITS VALUE
ENHANCED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE OTHER SPOUSE.

ABSENT ONE OF

THOSE THREE EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, SEPARATE PROPERTY SHOULD
17

NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY•
1.

The home on South Fir Street in Cedar City, Utah, is the

Defendant's separate property.
The basic rule regarding division of property between spouses
is that "the Court should make such orders in relation to the
property as may be equitable" Bushnell v. Bushnell, 649 P.2d 85 at
87 (Utah 1982).

However, "as a general rule, equity requires that

each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the
marriage" Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at 424 (Utah App. 1990)
citing Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 908 (Utah App. 1988), as
well as any "application or enhancement of its value". Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 at 308 (Ut 1988)
In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) the Court was
asked to reconsider a divorce decree which had awarded to the
defendant spouse a home purchased with her inheritance but had
awarded to the plaintiff husband the marital residence which,
defendant claimed on appeal, should have been acknowledged as a
joint asset with each party awarded an interest in the same. The
defendant wife argued that, by awarding the marital residence,
which was a joint asset, to the plaintiff, the Court had, in
essence, awarded the plaintiff a portion of her inheritance.

In

addressing that issue, the Court considered the general rule with
reference to separate property.

The Court of Appeals stated

Such property [separate property] may appropriately be
considered part of the marital estate, subject to
division, when the other spouse by his or her efforts
augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited or
donated property, (citations omitted), where the parties
had inextricably commingled the property with marital
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property so that it has lost its separate character,
(citations omitted) or where the recipient spouse has
contributed all or part of the property to the marital
estate." Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169.
The Court found it to be significant that the recipient of
inherited property had attempted to keep the property separate
during the marriage and stated that:
The separate character of the defendant's inheritance has
been maintained in separated accounts in portfolios and
the home she purchased. Conversion from one investment
medium to another does not by itself, destroy the
integrity of segregation. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169.
The Burt case was remanded to the trial court for further
findings to determine whether there were extraordinary situations
where equity demanded that the plaintiff be awarded an interest in
the defendant's separate property.

The Court set forth a three

step process which should be followed in considering property
division in divorce cases.

The Court stated:

On remand, the Court should first properly categorize the
parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the
separate property of one or the other. Each party is
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate
property and fifty percent of the marital property.
Second, the Court stated:
The Court should then consider the existence of
exceptional circumstances and, if any be shown, proceed
to an equitable distribution in light of those
circumstances and in conformity with our decision.
Finally:
That having been done, the final step is to consider
whether, following appropriate divisions of the property,
one party or the other is entitled to alimony." Burt, 799
P.2d at 1172.
Consistent with the ruling at Burt, the trial court should
first proceed to determine which property should be considered
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separate property and which property should be considered marital
property.

Although the Burt case discusses separate property in

terms of inherited or donated property, the same rule would apply
with reference to premarital property which has been acknowledged
as "separate property ... brought into the marriage,"

Haumont v.

Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at 424 (Utah App. 1990).
After the property has been properly classified as separate or
marital property, a trial court should then, consistent with the
Burt

decision,

determine

whether

there

are

exceptional

circumstances which mandate that the separate property of either
spouse be included in the marital estate.
In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1991) citing
Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah App. 1990), the Court stated
that the
appropriate factors for the trial court to consider in
including premarital property as part of the marital
estate include 'the amount and kind of property to be
divided, the source of the property, the parties' health,
the parties' standard of living and respective financial
conditions, their needs and earning capacities, the
duration of marriage and the relationship the property
has with the amount of alimony awarded. Haumont, 793
P.2d at 425.
The Court in Haumont suggested nine factors that may be
considered by the trial court in determining whether or not to
follow the presumption that "eguity reguires that each party retain
the separate property he or she brought into the marriage."
However, in light of the decision in Burt, which distilled those
factors to three, this Court should consider Plaintiff's claim to
an award of Plaintiff's premarital assets in the context of the
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three exceptional circumstances identified in Burt, although the
other factors identified in Haumont, including length of the
marriage, certainly support Defendant's claim that the home not be
included in the marital estate.
In Georgedes v. Georqedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981), Plaintiff
husband had brought a home and a business into the marriage.

The

home was subsequently titled in joint tenancy with the Defendant.
The trial court divided the property by allocating to each party
the property he or she brought into the marriage.
Plaintiff the home and business.
years.

This gave the

The marriage had lasted seven

Although the record on appeal in that case contained

relatively little evidence of the present value of the home and the
business awarded to the Plaintiff, the Supreme Court said:
That is not a reversible deficiency where, as here, the
court's decree simply puts the parties to a second
marriage of relatively short real duration back into sole
ownership of the properties they brought into the
marriage. Georqedes, 627 P.2 at 45.
Citing language from English v. English 565 P.2d 409 (Utah
1977), the Court stated:
This is not a case where the court would be required to
conclude from the evidence that the Defendant's
'efforts... in the monetary success of the marriage, '
made such a contribution to the increased value of the
marital property that she would be entitled to share in
that value in the property settlement.' Georgedes, 627
P.2d at 45.
When a marriage is a second marriage and of relatively short
duration, (approximately seven years) it is apparently generally
equitable that the parties be placed back into sole ownership of
the properties each brought into the marriage.
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It is important to note that, in making an equitable division,
the owner of separate property should not lose the benefit of his
or her separate property by the trial court automatically or
arbitrarily awarding the other spouse an equal amount of the
remaining property which was acquired by their joint efforts to
offset the separate property. Mortensen/ 760 P.2d at 308.

In

Mortensen the Court focused its analyses on gifts or inherited
property.

However, this same analysis would be appropriate in

analyzing marital property as well. In Mortensen. the Court went on
to state: "These rules will preserve and give effect to the right
that married persons have always had in this state to separately
own and enjoy property."

Mortensen. 7 60 P.2d at 308.

Where, as here, the Appellant challenges the factual findings
of the trial court, the Appellant has the responsibility to
marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's factual
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to
support that finding. Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P. 2 828 (Utah
1992)

In this instance, the following testimony and evidence was

presented by the Plaintiff in support of her claim that the home in
Cedar City was a martial asset: those parties looked for a home in
Cedar City (T. at 30 to 31); Plaintiff signed the Trust Deed Note
and a rider to that Note, recorded several months later.

(T. at

35-38); some preliminary documentation prepared in conjunction with
the purchase of the property identify the Plaintiff in conjunction
with that purchase (T. at 43, 61, and 62); at one point the seller
thought that she was selling it to both parties (T. at 299);
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Plaintiff thought she was a party to the purchase (T. at 46, 56,
365); the parties initially intended that Plaintiff's name would be
on the title (T. at 656); the Plaintiff thought she was on title
until this litigation (T. at 442 and 668); Plaintiff, at one point,
believed that the money for payment of the down payment of the home
came from the parties' joint account (T. at 71).

However, she

acknowledged that she did not know where the funds came from to buy
the home (T. at 52); Plaintiff took care of the home (T. at 75),
and certain improvements were made to the home after the home was
purchased, including adding hardwood floors and remodeling the
kitchen.

(T. at 226-227)

There never was a satisfactory explanation offered at trial
with reference to why the Plaintiff's name appeared on the Trust
Deed and the rider to the Promissory Note and yet did not appear on
other documents involved in the closing. However, as the testimony
developed, it was apparent that the down payment for purchase of
the home and the funds with which the Jacuzzi, added to the home,
was purchased, came from the sale of the Defendant's pre-marital
home in Mission Hills, California, (T. at 518-519) which the
Plaintiff admitted were the Defendant's pre-marital funds (T. at
431), in which she did not claim any interest (T. at 399) because
the Mission Hills home was the Defendant's pre-marital asset (T. at
490) and there was likewise no evidence offered to contradict the
Defendant's claim that all of the mortgage payments made to
purchase the home came from the Defendant's Langley Credit Union
checking account (T. at 601-602) into which the Defendant's pre23

marital and separate Air Force retirement had been deposited (T. at
396) and into which no other funds were deposited during the
marriage. (T. at 499) The Defendant acknowledged that the parties
had initially intended to combine the proceeds of the sale of his
pre-marital home with the proceeds of the sale of the home in which
the Plaintiff had a pre-marital interest and purchase a home. (T.
at 535)

However, certain problems developed,

including the

bankruptcy proceeding filed by the Plaintiff's ex-husband, who was
the owner of the home in which she claimed a pre-marital interest,
and the parties were unable to accomplish that goal.
537)

(T. at 535-

The parties then decided to look for a home in Utah (T. at

537), purchase a home in Utah with the Defendant's pre-marital
funds and later pay that home off with the proceeds realized upon
foreclosure and sale of the home in which Plaintiff claimed a premarital property interest. (T. at 540) Because of the Plaintiff's
bad credit, the home was purchased in the Defendant's name alone.
(T. at 539) This initial plan changed, however, and, following the
expenditure of substantial sums of money, time and effort to
foreclose Plaintiff's security interest in the home in which she
claimed a pre-marital interest, the parties determined to invest a
portion of the proceeds of the sale of that home in a business in
Cedar City instead of using those funds to pay off the mortgage on
the home titled in Defendant's name.

(T. at 661)

This is a marriage of relatively short duration in which the
Defendant contributed his premarital, separate property toward the
acquisition

of a home in Cedar City after the property was
24

acquired.

He clearly intended to maintain the separate nature of

his premarital property in the same by making all mortgage payments
from a separate bank account into which only income from his
separate, premarital retirement account was deposited.

The home

should have been acknowledged as his separate property and, in the
absence of any of the extraordinary circumstances identified in the
Burt case, should not have been included in the marital estate.
2.

The trial court's Order that the home on South Fir Street

be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties does
not constitute an equitable division of the property.
Even if the Court's finding that the home on South Fir
Street in Cedar City, Utah, was a marital asset were supported by
the evidence, the Court's decision to treat that asset the same as
the Sportsmen's Lounge, that is order that the same be sold and the
proceeds divided equally between the parties is not an equitable
division of the assets. The down payment on the home on South Fir
Street was paid with the proceeds of the sale of Defendant's
premarital home, an asset in which the Plaintiff

claimed no

interest (T. at 399) and the payments on that home were made with
the Defendant's separate premarital funds. (T. at 601-602)

There

is clearly a premarital interest in that asset even if the asset
itself were considered marital property.

On the other hand, the

Sportsmen's Lounge, purchased two years later with the proceeds of
the sale of what had been Plaintiff's premarital property was
properly found to be a marital asset.
At the time the parties were married the Plaintiff did
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have*an asset, an account receivable in the form of Trust Deeds
with a face amount of $70,000.00 secured by a home awarded to her
exhusband in her first divorce. However, those Trust Deeds were in
default. (T. at 341-342) The Defendant expended substantial effort
in order to preserve that asset by initiating legal action to
foreclose the property, making payments on the first mortgage
during the Plaintiff's exhusband's bankruptcy, initiating legal
action to obtain release from the Bankruptcy Court, foreclosing the
property and selling it.

(T. at 534-540)

In addition, the

Defendant, by his efforts, together with other family members,
enhanced the value of the property by physically working on the
premises prior to its sale. (T. at 583-584) The third prong of the
test identified in Burt to determine whether a premarital asset has
become marital

is established

by the Defendant's

significant

efforts to preserve, protect and improve that property.

However,

the property was also clearly contributed toward the marital estate
when the Plaintiff deeded the property to the Defendant during the
marriage (T. at 432-433).
The

trial

court

correctly

acknowledged

that

the

Sportsmen's Lounge, purchased with the proceeds of the sale of the
Aqua Dulce home in California is a marital asset and the proceeds
of sale of that asset should be divided equally between the
parties.

However, the home on South Fir Street presents an

entirely different situation.

Plaintiff did nothing to preserve,

protect or improve the home in Cedar City except to maintain the
property incident to residing there. It is patently inequitable to
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take an asset purchased with clearly premarital funds and treat
that in the same manner as an asset which, although it may trace
its origin to premarital funds, through the substantial efforts of
the other spouse, became a marital asset.
The Defendant has a premarital interest in that asset equal to
the down payment and the reduction in principal on the first trust
deed during the parties' marriage and the trial court erred in not
acknowledging

that

premarital

interest

and

awarding

to

the

Defendant a separate and premarital interest in the home in that
amount.
3.

The trial court should have acknowledged the Defendant's

interest in the Jaguar automobile and included only a portion of
its value in the marital estate.
The only testimony offered by the Plaintiff with reference to
the Jaguar automobile is that it was purchased during the marriage
(T. at 175) and that it was purchased as a gift for her (T. at
400).

However, that latter issue was hotly contested by Cynthia

Garcia, the Defendant's daughter, who Plaintiff identified as a
witness to Defendant's supposed announcement that the Jaguar was
purchased as a gift for the Plaintiff (T. at 476). Defendant, on
the other hand, testified that acquisition of the 1988 Jaguar
automobile had its origins in a 1984 Corvette, purchased for
$15,000.00 with $6,000.00 premarital funds. That vehicle was sold
for $9,000.00, (T. at 560) of which at least 40% was premarital
funds.

That $9,000.00 was combined with the approximately $10,000

home equity loan secured by the Cedar City home to purchase the
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Jaguar. (T. at 559-560, and 554) Accordingly, 40% of the $9,000.00
proceeds from sale of the 1984 Corvette, approximately 20% of the
total purchase price, is directly traceable to the Defendant's
premarital funds if the home eguity loan is considered a marital
asset and should be returned to Defendant before the marital
interest in that asset is distributed.

If, on the other hand, the

home is acknowledged as Defendant's separate property and he is
assigned the obligation to pay that debt himself, Defendant should
be paid 70% of the proceeds of sale of the vehicle before the
marital interest of 30% is distributed.
that the

1988 Jaguar

automobile

The trial court's ruling

is a marital

asset without

acknowledging Defendant's entitlement to be reimbursed for his
premarital interest in the same ignores the obvious intent of the
Defendant to retain a premarital interest in that vehicle by
titling it in his name alone (T. at 188) and the general rule of
equity that a party's premarital assets be returned to him upon
divorce unless the extraordinary circumstances identified in Burt
are present.
4.

The trial court should have included in its award of

marital property to the Plaintiff a dollar figure representing the
marital interest in the Porsche automobile and award the Defendant
assets to offset that amount.
Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff's Porsche
automobile is a premarital asset. (T. at 179)

However, more than

$10,000.00 in repairs were made on the Porsche during the marriage
(T. at 376). That substantially enhanced its value.
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Because the

repairs and improvements to the Porsche were paid for by the
Defendant

(T. at 377), a substantial

amount of the Porsche

automobile should have been included in the marital state.
trial the Defendant set the value

At

of the Porsche at $7,000.00 (T.

at 180) Although Plaintiff testified that Defendant told her he
should be reimbursed for the repairs when the home in Auga Dulce
sold,

(T. at 670) she does not know if he was reimbursed.

Defendant testified that he was not reimbursed for the repairs to
the Porsche. (T. at 657) However, even if Defendant received
"reimbursement" from the proceeds of sale of the Aqua Dulce home,
those proceeds were marital property.

When the parties married,

the Porsche needed a new engine, transmission, paint, wheels &
stereo.

In light of the evidence and the admitted expenditure of

marital funds toward the substantial enhancement of the value of
that vehicle during the marriage, the marital estate should have
been acknowledged to have had an interest equal to at least the
value of the vehicle and the Defendant should have been awarded
marital property of equal value to offset the award of the vehicle
to Plaintiff.
B.

IF AN ASSET HAS BEEN DISSIPATED OR ENHANCED IN VALUE BY

ONE OF THE PARTIES TO A DIVORCE PROCEEDING FOLLOWING SEPARATION THE
ASSET SHOULD BE VALUED AS OF THE DATE OF SEPARATION.
1. The Defendant's salaried savings plan should be valued as
of the date of separation/ not the date of the divorce decree.
In Utah, assets usually are valued at the time of the divorce
decree.

Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 1987).
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But Peck

acknowledges that if one party has dissipated an asset then the
trial court may value the property at an earlier date, i.e.,
separation. Jd.

Unfortunately, Defendant is aware of no recent

Utah appellant court decision that addresses what should happen if
a party has, through his or her separate efforts, enhanced rather
than dissipated an asset of the marriage.
•In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that his equity in the
home purchased subsequent to the plaintiff's filing for divorce
should

not have been

considered

a marital

asset

subject to

division. In reaching that decision, the Court relied on Utah Code
Annotated § 30-30-5 and "the rulings of this Court in accordance
therewith."

Utah Code Ann. § 30-30-5 does not specify a date for

the valuation of assets, except to direct that the Court may
indicate in its decree of divorce equitable orders relating to
property when the decree is rendered. UCA §30-3-5(1). However, the
Court specifically cited to Hamilton v. Hamilton/ 562 P. 2d 235
(Utah 1977), and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980)
with reference to the valuation date issue.

In Hamilton, there

was a four month gap between the time the divorce was rendered and
signed. During that time, the defendant had conveyed property to a
third party and represented himself to be a "single man".

The

decree of divorce had directed that the real property in the name
of the defendant and owned by the parties should remain in joint
ownership as tenants in common until the court, by further order,
directed distribution of the division of property.
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Plaintiff

claimed that the decree of divorce vested in her a one-half
interest in the real property conveyed to the third party.
Supreme

Court

determined

that, since

the

property

The

had been

transferred prior to entry of the decree of divorce, the decree did
not vest any title in the property in the plaintiff.
However,

in

light

of

the

Peck

decision, which

clearly

indicates that the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may
value assets at a date other than the date of divorce if the
property has been dissipated since separation, the Hamilton case
does not act to prohibit the trial court from considering an
alternate valuation date.
In Jesperson, the defendant asked the court to award him the
value of his labor on three personal residences purchased and sold
during the marriage.

The court disposed of that argument by

holding that "the marital estate is evaluated according to what
property exists at the time the marriage is terminated." Jesperson/
326, P. 2d at 328. (citing Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235.
light of recent developments

However, in

in that area of the law since

Jesperson, it is apparent that a trial court may evaluate an item
of property in the marital estate according to that property's
value on the date of separation if there are circumstances to
warrant an alternate valuation date.
To

the

extent

Fletcher

suggests

that

there

are

no

circumstances where an asset, enhanced by the exclusive efforts of
one party, cannot be valued as of the date of separation, it should
be overturned. The better rule is found in Re: Marriage of Wagner,
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679 P.2d 743 (Mont. 1984) in which the Supreme Court of that State
reaffirmed:
The time for proper valuation cannot be tied to any
single event in the dissolution process. The filing of
a petition, trial of the matter, or even the granting of
a decree of dissolution do not control the proper point
of evaluation by the district court. The exercise of
discretion by the district court is necessary when
determining the worth of marital assets which fluctuate
in value.
The court concluded
To consider for distribution those assets acquired by one
spouse after the marital relationship was terminated
might unjustly award a "windfall" to the dilatory spouse
who did not work to accumulate those post marital assets
and penalize the diligent spouse for sound business
judgment. Wagner, 679 P.2d at 758.
The date of separation is an appropriate date to consider
valuation of marital assets where "the marriage was irretrievably
broken and individual business practices have not yet altered the
financial status quo of the parties."

Marriage
partnership.
1988).

in the

state of Utah

Wagner 679 P.2d at 759.

has been

compared

to a

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 at Note 1 (Utah,

Although the comparison is not absolute, the general

concept that two individuals work together toward a common goal,
each providing a valuable services to the success of the marital
relationship, has been relied upon in determining a spouse's
interest in what would otherwise be the separate property of the
other spouse.
In Dunn v. Dunn, 808 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), defendant
husband was awarded

his entire premarital
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contribution

to a

retirement account because there was no evidence that the plaintiff
wife had "through her efforts, augmented, maintained, or protected
the separate property, other than her maintenance of the household
accounts." The Dunn Court acknowledged in that case that equitable
division of property contemplates that "property be fairly divided
between the parties given their contributions during the marriage
and their circumstances at the time of the divorce". Dunn/ 808 P.2d
at 1320.

Dunn specifically acknowledged that contributions during

the marriage would include lo^e, encouragement, companionship,
homemaking skills, etc.

Once the Plaintiff and Defendant in this

case separated, the equitable basis for allocating to the Plaintiff
a share of the Defendant's earned income no longer existed.
This case is fairly unique because the parties have maintained
a residence in this state, but the Defendant's employment is in
California. Since the employment as well as the retirement benefits
associated with that employment are within that state, California
law should apply to determine at what point during the divorce
process

the

Defendant's

earnings

are

his

separate property.

California Civil Code §5118 provides:
The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and minor
children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse,
while living separate and apart from the other spouse,
are the separate property of the spouse.
Applying that statute to the facts here where the Defendant
has been living separate and apart from the Plaintiff since the
first part of May, 1992, this Court should determine that the
Defendant's earnings after separation are his sole and separate
property. Thus, the Defendant's earnings, retirement benefits and
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any increase in savings or checking accounts accumulated since the
date, of separation should be his sole and separate property.
Accordingly, the date for valuation of the Defendant's retirement
benefits, as well as the date for valuation of savings and checking
accounts into which were deposited the Defendant's earnings, should
be the date of separation.
In light of California Civil Code §5118 designating the
earnings of a spouse following separation as his or her separate
property, and Utah statutory and case law which suggests that the
same rule should be applied in Utah as well, Defendant respectfully
submits that his earnings following separation and any assets
acquired

with

those

earnings,

including

enhancement

of

his

retirement or savings accounts, should be considered his sole and
separate

property.

Accordingly,

saving

accounts,

checking

accounts, and retirement benefits should be valued as of the date
of separation.
2.

The Plaintiff should have been ordered to repay to the

marital estate funds she withdrew from the Sportsmen's Lounge in
violation of orders issued by the Domestic Court Commissioner.
On May 25, 1992, the trial court commissioner ordered the
Plaintiff not to withdraw any funds from the Sportsmen's Lounge.
(Record at 42)

In violation of that Order, Plaintiff paid herself

a salary of $1,000.00 per month in August of 1992.

(T. at 362)

She continued to pay herself a monthly salary of $1,000.00, without
informing the Defendant until the date of trial. During that time,
she also received the full amount of support that Defendant was
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ordered to pay. The Plaintiff withdrew funds from a marital asset,
the Sportsmen's Lounge, in violation of the Court order, thus
dissipating the value of that asset to her benefit. Plaintiff
should have been ordered by the trial court to account for and
repay those funds to the marital estate.
Upon sale of the Sportsmen's Lounge, an offset should be
ordered against the Plaintiff's interest in the proceeds of sale so
that the marital estate is reimbursed for that withdrawal of funds
in the amount of $5,500.00. ($1,000.00 per month for each month
from mid August through December, 1992.)
3.

The Blazer automobile should have been valued as of the

date of the parties' separation and the same awarded to the
Plaintiff at that value.
At the time of the parties' separation, the Blazer automobile
had a value of $3,500.00. That value declined to $1,500.00 at the
time of trial.

(T. at 582)

The Blazer automobile was within the

control of the Plaintiff and the vehicle was driven by her son,
Kris, on several occasions.

(T. at 447-448)

While Kris had the

vehicle, the right front fender was damaged and had to be replaced,
(T. at 269) and Kris hot-rodded the Blazer "a little bit" while
rabbit hunting.

(T. at 468-469) Also, there was damage to the

Blazer's engine that is not associated with normal use. (T. at 336)
Since the Plaintiff had the responsibility to account to the
marital estate for assets left within her control she should be
responsible to the marital estate for the damage to the Blazer.
Defendant's testimony was uncontested that the decrease in value of
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the vehicle was $2,000.00 from the time the parties separated until
the time of trial.

(T. at 582)

The Plaintiff should be ordered to account to the marital
estate for the decrease in value of the Blazer automobile.

She

should be ordered to accomplish this by either purchasing the asset
from the marital estate for $3,500.00, its pre-separation value,
or, upon sale of the vehicle, as ordered by the trial court, the
Defendant should receive the first $1,750.00 of the sale proceeds,
one-half its value from the date of separation, and the Plaintiff
should be ordered to pay to the Defendant, out of her separate
funds, a sufficient amount to reimburse Defendant for his interest
in the Blazer automobile.
4. The Plaintiff should be ordered to repay to the Defendant
the full value of the loss of and damage to his fire arms which
were left in her control and which were damaged by her minor son.
If a party is responsible to account to the marital estate for
dissipation of marital property, that party should, by the stronger
reasoning, account to the other party for the dissipation of that
party's separate and pre-marital asset.
Following the parties' separation, the Plaintiff's minor son
used the Defendant's fire-arms. (T. at 268) The firearms are
Defendant's pre-marital property.

(T. at 644) A shotgun valued at

$375.00 was missing and Defendant testified that the damage to his
other

firearms

after

separation

would

require

approximately

$1,500.00 to repair.
Since

the

Plaintiff

had

control
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and

possession

of the

Defendant's firearms during the pendency of the proceedings, she
should be ordered to reimburse the Defendant the sum of $1,875,00
out of her separate funds for the damage caused by Plaintiff's
minor son to Defendant's firearms and for the missing shotgun.
C.

A CHILD SUPPORT ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE ACCUMULATED BY ONE

PARTY DURING A MARRIAGE, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE OTHER PARTY TO THAT
MARRIAGE HAS SUPPORTED THE CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSE IN WHOSE FAVOR
THE RECEIVABLE HAS ACCRUED, IS AN ASSET WHICH, IN THE INTEREST OF
EQUITY, SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE VALUE OF MARITAL ASSETS ALLOCATED
TO THE CREDITOR SPOUSE.
Plaintiff testified that in her divorce obtained prior to her
marriage to the defendant, child support for her minor child, Kris,
was awarded against Kris' father in the amount of $ 800.00 per
month.

[T. at 200] Kris resided with the Plaintiff and Defendant

duriflg the marriage and was fully supported by them. (T. at 379)
Child support payments totalling $150.00 were received from Kris'
father, Plaintiff's ex-husband, during the parties' marriage, (T.
at 381) leaving a receivable for the 80 1/2 months Plaintiff and
Defendant resided together of $64,250.00.
The issue before the Court is whether an accrued receivable
for child support, acquired during the marriage and in favor of one
party should be taken into account in allocating assets between the
parties. Apparently, this is an issue of first impression in this
state.

However, accounts receivable are clearly assets which may

be considered in the division of marital property.
SoreRSon, 839 P.2d 774, (Utah 1992).
37

Sorenson v.

Child support is a unique receivable in that it is accumulated
in favor of one party for the benefit of a child.

However, if the

marital estate has provided the support for that child, then in
equity, the marital estate ought to receive an interest in that
receivable and be compensated if the receivable is ever liquidated.
C.f. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430

(Utah

1983).

This is

especially so in the context of a child support award which, in
certain aspects, is a preferred debt as to which there are specific
statutory provisions for collection, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9, §
62A-11-101 et al.

In addition, at least in Utah, a child support

obligation becomes a judgment on the date the support is due. (Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-106.)
In this

case, child

support

is a receivable which the

Plaintiff has accumulated during the marriage.
asset as to which a value should be assigned.

It is clearly an
However, the trial

court refused to consider and assign a value to the claim for
reimbursement for child support.

In light of the preferred nature

of that debt, value should have been assigned to that asset in the
amount of $64,250.00.

Not only is the asset one which should be

included in the ultimate division of property, but it is an asset
that should be considered a marital asset for purposes of property
distribution,

the

parties

having

expended

marital

funds

to

accomplish the purpose for which the child support is intended: the
support of the Plaintiff's minor son.
In Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, (Utah 1983), the Supreme
Court classified that child support money in two categories, one,
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the right of the child to receive support money from the noncustodial parent, and two, the right to receive reimbursement for
money expended to support the child.

Id.

Under the second

category, the right to reimbursement belongs to the person or
persons that furnished the support to the obligee child:
[S]uppose a father (parent) fails over a
period of time to furnish support of the
child, and the mother, or someone else,
furnishes it. That person then has the right
to claim reimbursement from the parent, the
same as any other past debt. This right of
reimbursement belongs to whomever furnished
the support; and it is subject to negotiation
settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the
same manner as any other debt. Id.

Failure of the trial court to consider and value the claim for
reimbursement of child support expended by the marital estate
improperly excluded a tenable asset of the marital estate.
D.

BUSINESS DEBTS ACCUMULATED BY THE PARTIES' JOINTLY OWNED

BUSINESS PRIOR TO THE SEPARATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED TO THE MARITAL
ESTATE.
The trial court's intent in this case was to effect an equal
division of marital property. (T. at 737)

One of the marriage's

principal assets is the Sportsmen's Lounge in Cedar City, Utah.
The Court ordered that the Lounge be sold and the proceeds divided
equally between the parties. However, the Court departed from its
intent to treat the Sportsmen's Lounge as an asset in which the
parties had equal ownership and financial responsibility. This is
so because

the

trial

court

assigned

to

the

Defendant

full

responsibility for payment of the credit card debt accumulated
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prior to the parties' marriage for travel expenses incurred during
Defendant's commute from Cedar City to his place of employment by
refusing to order the credit card debt paid by the Lounge.
There is no justification in the record to support the Court's
departure from its obvious intent with reference to treatment of
the Sportsmen's Lounge and, accordingly, it was an abuse of the
trial

court's

discretion

to

assign

to

the

Defendant

full

responsibility for payment of that debt.
This Court should order that, upon sale of the Sportsmen's
Lounge, the credit card debt in the amount of $4,882.35 (T. at 592593) be paid out of the proceeds of sale.
G.

THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY AN OBLIGATION ORDERED BY

THE COURT WHILE WAITING FOR A HEARING AND RULING BY THE COURT WITH
REFERENCE TO THAT OBLIGATION IS NOT CONTEMPT.
On May 21, 1993, the Domestic Court Commissioner had ordered
that the Defendant used the tax refund for payment of business
debts associated with Sportsmen's Lounge. (Record at 42)

The

Defendant paid certain debts incurred in conjunction with operation
of the Sportsmen's Lounge but held the balance during the pendency
of the proceedings. (T. at 594)

Defendant requested a ruling on

his claim that the credit card debt for travel expenses is a
business debt.

The trial court did not rule on that issue at

trial. Defendant filed a motion to supplement the findings. (T. at
283)

At the time of the hearing on that matter the trial court

denied the motion and, instead, found the Defendant in contempt for
failure to pay the proceeds as had been ordered by the Court
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despite the Defendant's claim that the debt was a business debt and
in light of the court's earlier order that the refund be used to
pay business debts.
UCA § 78-32-1 describes the acts that constitute contempt of
court. Disobedience of a lawful order of the court may constitute
contempt UCA § 78-32-1(5).

However, in order to be guilty of

contempt in a civil proceeding, the evidence must be clear and
convincing that the Defendant 1) know what was required, 2) had the
ability to comply, 3) intentionally failed or refused to do so. Von
Hake v. Thomas, 759 P2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
In this instance, the Defendant's conduct does not satisfy the
elements for contempt.

His failure to pay one-half the refund to

Plaintiff was a result of his question as to what was required of
him.

On the one hand he had been ordered to use the money to pay

business debts which should have included the pre-separation travel
expense debt, and on the other hand he had been ordered to pay onehalf the money to Plaintiff.

Until the confusion regarding

classification of the travel expense debt as a business debt was
clarified, Defendant did not know what was required of him.

The

sanction imposed of attorney's fees to Plaintiff's counsel should
be lifted.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's treatment of premarital and marital assets
ignored existing case law in this state and resulted

in an

inequitable division of property. This Court should enter an order
that the home on South Fir Street is the premarital asset of the
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Defendant and should order that he immediately be entitled to
possession of same.

In the alternative, in the event this Court

were to determine that the home on South Fir Street is a marital
asset, and that the same should be sold, the Court should order
that the Defendant receive, out of the proceeds of sale and in
recognition of his premarital contribution toward purchase of that
asset, the $37,000.00 down payment plus the $5,000.00 spent to
purchase the Jacuzzi and the reduction in principal on the first
mortgage as his separate property with the balance of the net
equity to be divided equally between the parties.
The proceeds of the sale of the Jaguar automobile, which the
Court has been ordered sold should be allocated between the parties
in recognition of the Defendant's premarital interest in same.
The Defendant should receive 20% of the net proceeds upon sale of
that asset if the marital estate remains liable for the home equity
loan or 70% if responsibility for payment of the home equity loan
is assessed to Defendant, with the balance to be divided equally
between the parties.
The Plaintiff's Porsche automobile, a premarital asset of the
Plaintiff,
substantial

is

an

asset

interest.

in which

Accordingly,

the marital
in

estate

formulating

its

has a
equal

division of the marital estate, the Court should assign to the
Plaintiff's portion of the marital estate the sum of $7,000.00 in
recognition of her receiving the marital estate's full interest in
that-asset.

Other assets should be awarded to the Defendant to

offset the marital portion of the automobile having been awarded to
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the Plaintiff in full.
Upon sale of the Sportsmen's Lounge the Plaintiff should be
ordered to repay to the marital estate out of her share of the
proceeds, the sum of $5,500.00 in recognition of her having taken
that sum from the Sportsmen's Lounge in violation of the existing
Court Order and using the same for her own benefit.
The Blazer automobile should be awarded to Plaintiff or
ordered sold and the Plaintiff ordered to pay Defendant one half of
the vehicle's value at separation or supplement the proceeds of
sale so that Defendant receives $1,750.00 upon sale of that asset,
in recognition of Plaintiff's having allowed dissipation of that
asset while it was under her control.
The Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the Defendant, out
of her share of the proceeds of the sale of the Sportsmen's Lounge
the amount of $1,875.00 to compensate the Defendant for the loss
and damage caused to the Plaintiff's premarital property, his
firearms, while the same were in the home and in the possession and
control of the Plaintiff.
The Defendant's salaried savings plan should have been valued
as of the parties' separation in the amount of $72,513.19, and this
Court should so order, awarding to the Plaintiff an interest in
that salaried savings plan consistent with Woodward v. Woodward,
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) and allow the Defendant the option of
offsetting that value against his interest in the Sportsmen's
Lounge or against other assets awarded to the Plaintiff.
As her share of the marital estate, the Plaintiff should be
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awarded the sum of $64,250.00 as an account receivable for child
support accumulated during the marriage and the Defendant should be
awarded other assets of the marriage sufficient to offset that
award.
Upon sale of the Sportsmen's Lounge, the outstanding credit
card debt for travel expenses incurred prior to the parties'
separation in the amount of $4,882.35 should be paid prior to
allocating the net proceeds of sale to the parties.
This Court should set aside the trial court's finding that
Defendant was in contempt for failure to pay directly to the
Plaintiff one-half of the income tax refund, in light of the
legitimate question for which the Defendant sought a ruling
concerning disposition of that asset and set aside the sanction
imposed.

DATED this

day of

, 1993

G. Michael Westfall
of and for
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the above and foregoing Appellant's Brief on the
day of
August, 1993, to the following:
Dale W. Sessions, Esq.
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
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250 South Main Street
Cedar City, UT 84721-0726

G. Michael Westfall
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Attorney for Defendant
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
P.O. Box 367
St. George, UT 84770
(801) 628-1682
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LYNDA ANN SMITH,
Plaintiff

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR.

Civil No. 924500057

Defendant

The above entitled matter came before the Court for trial on
December 3, 4, and 10, 1992. The Plaintiff was present in person
and represented by her counsel of record, Dale W. Sessions, of the
law firm of CHAMBERLAIN S HIGBEE.

The Defendant was present in

person and represented by his counsel of record, G. Michael
Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL & WILCOX. Witnesses
were sworn and testified. Exhibits were marked and introduced into
evidence. Upon consideration of the evidence presented, the Court
hereby makes and enters the following:

Findings S Conclusions

FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff has been an actual and bona fide resident of
mty, State of Utah for three months immediately prior to
mencement of this action.

Defendant has consistently

1 residency in the State of Utah during these proceedings
Court finds Defendant is also a Utah resident.
The parties were married on August 17, 1985 in Las Vegas,
junty, Nevada, and since that time have been and now are
and wife.
Irreconcilable differences have arisen in the marriage
It impossible for the parties to continue the marriage
LShip.
There have been no children born as issue of this marriage
are expected; however, Plaintiff has custody of one child
fe 18 from a prior marriage.

That child will achieve his

-thday during 1993.
Alimony
a.

Financial conditions and needs of the receiving

(plaintiff):

The plaintiff

claims

in her Financial

xe statement and the Court finds that she needs $605.00 per
) satisfy her financial needs, plus housing costs.
mortgage

on the

home

at

1098

South

Fir

The

Street is

lately $450.00 per month, for a total monthly income need of
0.

Plaintiff will have no dependents in addition to

when her son from a prior marriage reaches 18 in 1993.

nclusions

2

5""

Plaintiff is not able to do heavy lifting and wouldn't be able to
work in a job that required that. However, that physical problem
is not to the degree that she cannot ski or work.
c.

The ability of the responding spouse (defendants to

provide support: The Defendant generates $5,551.00 per month gross
earned income and has $5,086.00 monthly expenses.

Defendant is

capable of providing alimony to the Plaintiff in some amount with
the difference.
d. Additional Factors: The parties' had a short to moderate
length marriage of seven (7) years, entered in mid-life when the
parties' careers were established. Each party has maintained
employment skills at oasically the same level they were at the time
of the marriage. The Plaintiff was laid off, or gave up working as
a clerk in an auto parts store in California in a minimum wage
range of employment, and that is basically where she would reenter
the work force now. There was a very general reference to modeling
at a high wage rate, but credible evidence was not produced
supporting that claim.

This is in contrast to a case where the

parties married young, one spouse put another through school,
stayed home to raise children, divorced after a lengthy marriage,
or terminated or refrained from entering an educational program at
the request or insistence of the other spouse.
Summary: While Defendant has the ability to pay some alimony,
Plaintiff is able to support herself with her present lifestyle
without it.

Her monthly income shortfall of $250.00 ($805 income

after the bar is sold less $1,055 expenses) will be more than
Findings & Conclusions
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offset by the $95,000,00+ generated by the sale of assets.

For

example, it would only take a 3.16% annual return on investment on
the $95,000.00 to generate $250/month to cover that difference
without reducing principal. In addition to this amount, Plaintiff
will soon receive proceeds from the sale of certain joint personal
property ordered sold by this court, and a portion of Defendant's
retirement and savings plan either in the future or in an earlier
cash out.
6.

Plaintiff's accounts receivable for child support from a

prior marriage are not an asset of the marriage and not something
the court should distribute as part of this action.

The Court

finds those to be a premarital obligation of a prior husband and,
as such, are not appropriate for the Court to distribute as an
asset of the marriage in this case.
7.

Each party should assume and pay any debt incurred since

their separation (which began during the first part of May 1992)
except any debt incurred for the benefit of the Sportsmen Lounge,
i.e repairs, pest control, remodeling etc. should be the joint
responsibility of the parties.
8. There are sufficient funds in this divorce to equalize the
property

distribution,

so

as

far

as

premarital

assets

are

concerned, the value is not important, it is moot. The premarital
property of the Plaintiff should go back to the Plaintiff and the
property

of

the

Defendant

should

go back

to

the Defendant

irrespective of the asset value.
9.

The following property is the Defendant's premarital

Findings & Conclusions
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property and should not be divided in these proceedings but,
instead, should be acknowledged as the Defendant's sole and
separate premarital property:
(a)

Defendant's Air Force retirement which had fully

vested prior to his marriage to Plaintiff.
(b) The 1974 XKE Jaguar.
(c) The 1977 XJS Jaguar.
(d)

Defendant's IRA account with the Lockheed Federal

Credit Union.
(e)

Defendant's IRA account with the Langley Federal

Credit Union.
(f) The 1989 Sea Ray boat.
(g)

The following household furnishings and personal

property: VCR, Microwave, coffee maker, blender, toaster, pots and
pans, dishes with flowers, silver

(12 piece

setting), glass

canisters (old English candy jar), Air Force collector's mugs,
clothes dryer, clothes washer, refrigerator and freezer, couch
(rust colored), rocking chair, love seat and two stools, kitchen
table

and

four chairs, end

table

(2) coffee

table, stereo

equipment, tools in garage; picture (deer from son), family bible,
books, afghan (made by Defendant's mother), 25" color TV, 14'
aluminum bass boat, 2 other TV sets, antique guns, desk and chair,
one water bed, movie camera, Teak wall unit, premarital personal
items and clothing; fire arms and hunting equipment.
(h)
Salaried

Defendant's premarital interest in the Lockheed

Savings Plan
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(including the
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401K) and the Lockheed

retirement program, the value of same to be calculated using the
Woodward formula based on the value of said Salaried Savings Plan
on December 10, 1992, and a present value for the Lockheed
Retirement program, which will provide a monthly income flow of
$490.29 to Defendant when he reaches the age of 65, approximately
15 years from now of $8,755.19 by stipulation of the parties.
10.

The following items of personal property are found to be

the premarital property of the Plaintiff and are acknowledged as
such, free and clear of any claim by the Defendant to same:
(a)

1982 Chevy Citation.

(b) Custom waterbed, dresser, etc.
(c) China cabinet.

11.

(d)

19" portable color TV.

(e)

1969 Porsche automobile.

Specifically, with reference to the Porsche automobile,

the Court finds that the Porsche should be awarded to the Plaintiff
as a premarital asset in total, although the Court finds that there
were repairs made to the Porsche during the marriage.
12.

The Court finds as a general rule on these assets that

assets and value of assets should be determined as of the time of
the divorce according to Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah
1985).

The Court finds the following items of property to be

marital property and finds the values as indicated and that the
property should be awarded as indicated:
To Defendant:
(a)
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The 1979 Corvette, has a value of $3,000.00 and
*J

should be awarded to the Defendant.
(b) The 46" color TV has a value of $950.00 and should
be awarded to the Defendant. That finding of value was arrived at
by taking the average of Plaintiff's opinion that the value of that
item is $1,300.00 and Defendant' opinion that it is worth $600.00.
(c) The 30.6 rifle should be awarded to the Defendant.
The value is $225.00.
(d)
Defendant.

The outdoor furniture should be awarded to the

The value of the outdoor furniture is $100.00.
(e) The butcher's blocks with knife sets are found to be

worth $40.00 each. One of them should be awarded to the Defendant.
(f) The couch/pull-out bed, valued at $75.00 should be
awarded to Defendant.
To Plaintiff:
(g)

The 1982 Ford pickup should be awarded to the

Plaintiff.

The Court finds that the Ford pickup has a value of

$2,400.00.

This finding was arrived at by averaging Plaintiff's

opinion that the value of the pickup truck is $3,000.00 and
Defendant's opinion that it is worth $1,800.00.
(h) The soda cooler should be awarded to^ the Plaintiff.
The Court finds that the soda cooler has a value of $180.00.

That

finding was arrived at by averaging Plaintiff's opinion that the
value of that item of property is $300.00 and Defendant's opinion
that it is worth $65.00.
(i) The

lawn mower should be awarded to the Plaintiff.

The Court finds its value to be $100.00.
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(j)

The willow furniture should be awarded to the

Plaintiff• The Court finds the value, of the willow furniture to be
$275.00.

That finding is based on an average of Plaintiff's

opinion that the value of the willow furniture is $450.00 and
Defendant's opinion that it is worth $100.00.
(k)

The duck pictures

should

be

awarded to the

Defendant. The Court finds the value to be $100.00, based in part
on Plaintiff's claim that the purchase price was $25.00.
(1) The dome clock should be awarded to the Plaintiff.
The Court finds *the value of the dome clock to be $55.00.

That

finding is based on an average of Plaintiff's opinion that the
value of the dome, clock is $35.00 and Defendant's opinion that the
value is $75.00.
(m) The plants should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The
Court finds the value of the plants to be $350.00. That finding is
based on an average of Plaintiff's opinion that the value of the
plants is $200.00 and Defendant's opinion that the value is
$500.00.
(n) One of the butcher's blocks with knife set should be
awarded to the Plaintiff with a value of $40.00.
(o)
the Plaintiff.

The kitchen wall decorations should be awarded to
The Court finds the value of the kitchen wall

decorations to be $30.00.

That finding is based on an average of

Plaintiff's opinion that the value of the kitchen wall decoration
is $20.00 and Defendant's opinion that the value is $40.00.
(p) The blue plates should be awarded to the Plaintiff.
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The Court finds the value of the blue plates to be $75.00•
(q)

The afghans, other than the one made by the

Defendant's mother, should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The Court
finds the value of these afghans to be $150.00.
(r)^ The couch, chair, foot stool (earth tones) should be
awarded to the Plaintiff.

They have a value of $150.00.

The Court finds by totalling the values of the assets
distributed in the preceding paragraph, approximately $4,200.00 is
being given to Defendant and approximately $3,600.00 is being given
to Plaintiff. The Court finds that the extra $600.00 more awarded
to Defendant is for an offset for the loss of Defendant's property
from the Blazer which was supposed to be left at the airport for
his use.

The Court finds the distribution set out thus far is,

therefore, equalized.
13.

The Sportsmen's Lounge~was purchased for $190,000.00 with

an approximate $60,000.00 down payment.

It needs repair.

The

lounge lost money for a period of time.

Recently, it has been

operating in the black. The Court finds the Sportsmen's Lounge is
a marital asset.

Both parties want the Sportsmen's Lounge sold.

It should be sold together with the real property owned by the
parties in conjunction with the business and all assets of the
business and the proceeds divided equally between the parties, or
offset against other assets, with all encumbrances, including
mortgages, and costs of sale to be paid prior to distribution or
allocating

of

the

sale proceeds.

The

parties

should take

commercially reasonable steps to affect sale of the Sportsmen's
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Lounge.
The Court finds Plaintiff is operating the bar in the black
and she should be allowed to continue to operate the business as
the manager and to draw from this point forward, $1,000.00 per
month as she has done since mid-August, 1992. The Court finds that
Plaintiff does work at the Sportsmen's Lounge and is entitled to
receive reimbursement for that work.
Additionally, the Court finds that it is not feasible to hire
a third party to act as manager based on the testimony of the
auditor, Worth Grimshaw, C.P.A.
14.

The Court finds that the Defendant does not have a

premarital interest in the marital residence at 1098 South Fir
Street

or

in

the

Sportsmen's

Lounge.

Although

Defendant

unilaterally placed his name on the Cedar City home, the Court
finds that the property was purchased during the time of the
marriage, each party lived in the home, the Plaintiff continuously
and the Defendant on weekends, and all of the real property
purchased in Cedar City should be treated as marital property.

To

treat the Plaintiff's $100,000.00 California home sale proceeds as
co-mingled

assets and turn around and treat the Defendant's

$46,000.00 California home sale proceeds as separate property may
be what the Defendant alone planned, but would not be equitable and
isn't justified under the evidence as viewed by the Court.

No

signed waiver of interest relative to the Cedar City home has been
produced. But, even with the asset being just in his name, the
Court finds that each party owned a premarital home and each party
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received proceeds from the sale of their premarital home after this
marriage, Plaintiff in the amount of $100,000.00 in October of 1990
and Defendant in the amount of $46,000.00 in 1988.
The assets (proceeds) were co-mingled.

Each party shared in

the use of the proceeds and, in fact, the Plaintiff testified her
$100,000.00 went into an account with only his (Defendant's) name
on it. The Court finds the assets were thereby co-mingled.
15.

Both parties claim a strong interest and apparently do

have a strong interest in the home. However, both seem to have an
aversion to it. The Plaintiff spends time away from the home and
the Defendant lives and works in a different state.

The court

finds that the home at 1098 South Fir Street, together with the
Jacuzzi, bar and bar stools, and the Sportsmen's Lounge should be
treated as marital property and should be sold and the proceeds
divided equally between the parties or offset against other assets
as

set

forth

hereinafter, with

all

encumbrances, including

mortgages and the home equity loan, and costs of sale to be paid
prior to distribution or allocation of the sale proceeds.

The

parties are to take commercially reasonable steps to affect sale of
the home and Sportsmen's Lounge.
16.

Pending sale the Plaintiff should be awarded possession

and management of the Sportsmen's Lounge and should be allowed to
continue to pay herself a salary of $1,000.00 per month.
17.

Plaintiff should be awarded possession of the home at

1098 South Fir Street pending sale and should be responsible to pay
the first mortgage on the home.
Findings & Conclusions
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The Defendant should make the

house payment through December, 1992. Beginning January 1, 1993,
the Plaintiff should make the first mortgage payment on the home.
The Defendant should be ordered to provide the Plaintiff with the
address where payments are made and to make arrangements so that
the payments can be made by the Plaintiff on the first mortgage.
The Defendant should be responsible to pay the monthly payments as
they come due on the home equity loan secured by the home at 1098
South Fir Street.
18.

The

Zourt

finds

that

all

assets, including the

Defendant's Salaried Savings Plan should be valued as of December
10, 1992.

The value of the Salaried Savings Plan should be

established by a statement similar to Exhibit " 39" prepared by the
persons administrating the Salaried Savings Plan, reserving to the
Court jurisdiction to set the value in the event there is a dispute
between the parties.
19.

The Defendant should be allowed to either pay to the

Plaintiff one-half the value of the marital share of the Salaried
Savings Plan, and the Lockheed retirement Program, calculated
consistent with the Woodward decision or the Defendant may elect to
allow Plaintiff to keep a portion of Defendant's share of the
proceeds of sale of the home and lounge equal to the Plaintiff's
interest in the 401K salary savings plan based on the Woodward
formula and the value of the Salaried Savings Plan and the Lockheed
Retirement Program.
20.

Defendant is holding, in his checking account, $2,550.12

of the parties' income tax refund for 1991. Of this refund amount,
Findings & Conclusions
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Defendant should be ordered to pay the outstanding bill for repair
presently due and payable to Sillitoe Repair Shop in the amount of
$126,56, the amount due and owing to Marjorie Young and the balance
should be divided equally between the parties.
21.

The Court finds that the following items of personal

property should be sold and the proceeds divided equally between
the parties:
(a) A 1977 Swinger motor home. The Court finds that this
item of property, was acquired during the marriage and is marital
property.
(b) The 1988 Jaguar automobile. This item was acquired
•during the marriage and the Court finds it to be a marital asset.
Because the parties' testimony as to value is too far apart, the
Court find that it may not be fair to average the parties'
respective opinions as to the value of this item and the Court
therefore orders that the 1988 Jaguar be sold and the proceeds
divided equally between the parties.
(c)

The Piper Arrow airplane should be sold and the

proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties.
(d)

The 1980 Blazer automobile should be sold and the

proceeds distributed equally between the parties.
22.

The Court finds that there is reason and grounds for

issuing a permanent injunction.

Potentially, there may be a

problem between the parties since they inevitably have to get
together at real estate closings during property division, etc.
The Court finds Defendant physically and verbally abused Plaintiff
Findings & Conclusions
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and even displayed a lack of temper control in Court. A permanent
injunction restraining Defendant from any contact with Plaintiff
should be ordered.
23.

The Defendant should be allowed to retrieve his personal

property, household goods and furnishings from the home at 1098
South Fir Street on December 28, 29, and 30, 1992, in the presence
of a neutral third party.

If Mrs. Marjorie Young is the third

party present at that time, then the parties should pay to her out
of the tax refund money held by the Defendant a fair hourly rate in
the $5.00 to $10.00 per hour range, to be negotiated directly with
Mrs. Young.

If there is a dispute between the parties concerning

any item of personal property which Defendant claims is his, the
Court should reserve jurisdiction to resolve that dispute.
24.

Each party will have sufficient assets with each to pay

his or her own costs and expenses, including attorney's fees.
Therefore, no attorney's fees should be awarded to either party.
25.

Plaintiff should be restored to her maiden name of Lynda

Ann Nehen.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and
enters the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject

matter of this lawsuit.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the

Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences the same to
become final and effective immediately upon signature and entry.
3.

No alimony should be awarded to either party.
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4.

Plaintiff should not be ordered to repay Defendant for

alimony paid during the time she has been drawing a salary from the
Sportsmen's Lounge.
5.

Each party should be awarded his or her premarital

property as set forth hereinabove.
6.

Marital property should be awarded to the parties as set

forth hereinabove.
7.".Those items of marital property identified in the Findings
of Fact should be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the
parties. However, the Defendant should have the option of trading
a portion of his share in the proceeds of sale of the home and
Sportsmen's Lounge for the Plaintiff's interest in the retirement
and his Salaried Savings Plan and Lockheed Retirement Program.
'8. Defendant should be allowed to retrieve his property from
the home at 1098 South Fir Street in Cedar City, Utah, as set forth
above.
9.

The Defendant should be restrained from any contact with

the Plaintiff except in the presence of a neutral third party or
counsel.
10.

The Court finds as a general rule on these assets that

assets and value of assets should be determined as of the time of
the divorce according to Berger, 713, P.2d 695.
11.

Plaintiff should be restored to her former name of Lynda

Ann Nehen.
12. Each party should pay his or her own costs and attorney's

Findings & Conclusions
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fees incurred herein.
DATED this

I

[/V"*^"
day of /5?i

./ 1993,

BY THE COURT:

Robert T. Braithwaite
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

DALE W. SESSIONS
Attorney for Plaintiff

Findings & Conclusions
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DECREE OF DIVORCE

Addendum Item Number 2

%

GALLIAN, WESTFALL & WILCOX
G. Michael Westfall #3434
Attorney for Defendant
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
P. 0. Box 367
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LYNDA SMITH,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR.,
Defendant.

Civil No. 924500057

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on
December 3, 4 and 10, 1992. The Plaintiff was present in person and
represented by her counsel of record, Dale W. Sessions, of the law
firm of CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE.
and

represented by his counsel of record, G. Michael Westfall of

the law firm of GALLIAN
testified.
Upon

The Defendant was present in person

& WESTFALL.

Exhibits were marked

consideration

of

the

and

evidence

Witnesses were sworn and
introduced
presented,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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the Court made

Based thereon the Court

now ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:

^

into evidence.

1.

The Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the

Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to
become final and effective immediately upon signature and entry.
2.

No alimony is awarded to the Plaintiff.

3.

Each party

shall assume and pay any individual debts

incurred since their separation during the first part of May, 1992,
except any debt incurred for the benefit of the Sportsman's Lounge,
i.e., repairs, pest control, remodeling, etc., should be the joint
responsibility of the parties.
4.

The

following property

is the Defendant's

pre-marital

property and is not divided in these proceedings but, instead, is
acknowledged

as

the

Defendant's

sole

and

separate

pre-marital

property:
(a).

Defendant's Air Force retirement which had fully
vested prior to his marriage to Plaintiff.

(b).

The 1974 XKE Jaguar.

(c).

The 1977 XJS Jaguar.

(d).

The Defendant's IRA account with the Lockheed
Federal Credit Union.

(e).

The Defendant's IRA account with the Langley Federal
Credit Union.

(f).

The 1989 Sea Ray boat.

(g).

The following household furnishings and personal
property: VCR, Microwave, coffee maker, blender,
toaster, pots and pans, dishes with flowers, silver
(12 piece setting), glass cannisters (old english
candy jars), Air Force collector's mugs, clothes

6.

The Court awards the following items of marital property as

indicated free and clear of any claim by the other party to same.
A.

To the Defendant:
.(1).

The 1979 Corvette.

(2).

The 46" color TV.

(3).

The 30.6 rifle.

(4) . The outdoor furniture.

B.

(5).

One butcher's block with knife set.

(6)-.

The couch/pull-out bed.

To the Plaintiff:
(1).

The 1982 Ford pickup.

(2) .' The soda cooler.
(3) . The lawn mower.
(4) . The willow furniture.
(5) . The duck pictures.
(6).. The dome clock
(7).

The plants

(8).

One of the butcher's blocks with knife set.

(9).

The kitchen wall decorations

(10).

The blue plates

(11).

The afghans, other than the one made by the
Defendant's mother

(12) .

7.

The home

The couch, chair, foot stool (earth tones)

at

1098

South

Fir

Street, together with

the

Jacuzzi, bar and bar stools, and the Sportsmen's Lounge, together
with the real estate owned by the parties in conjunction with that

business

and all assets of the business, shall be sold and the

proceeds divided equally between the parties or offset against other
assets as set forth hereinafter, with all encumbrances, including
mortgages and the home equity loan, and costs of sale to be paid
prior

to

distribution

or

allocation

of

the

sale proceeds.

The

parties are to take commercially reasonable steps to affect sale of
the home and Sportsmen's Lounge,
8.

Pending

sale

the

Plaintiff

is

awarded

possession

and

management of the Sportsmen's Lounge and is allowed to continue to
pay herself a salary of $1,000.00 per month.
9.

Plaintiff is awarded possession of the home at 1098 South

Fir Street pending sale and is responsible to pay the first mortgage
on the home.

The Defendant shall make the house payment through

December, 1992.

Beginning January 1, 199 3, the Plaintiff shall make

the first mortgage payment on the home.

The Defendant is ordered to

provide the Plaintiff with the address where payments are made and
to make
Plaintiff

arrangements
on that

so

that

the

first mortgage.

payments
The

can

be made

Defendant

by

the

shall pay

the

monthly payments as they come due on the home equity loan secured by
the home at 109 8 South Fir Street.
10.

The value of the Salaried Savings Plan on December 10,

1992, shall be established by a statement similar to Exhibit M 39"
prepared by the persons administrating the Salaried Savings Plan,
reserving to the Court jurisdiction to set the value in the event
there is a dispute between the parties.
11.

The Defendant may either pay to the Plaintiff one-half the

value of the marital share of the Salaried Savings Plan and the

Lockheed Retirement Program, calculated consistent with the Woodward
decision, or the Defendant may elect to allow Plaintiff to keep a
portion of Defendant's share of the proceeds of sale of the home and
lounge equal to the Plaintiff's interest in the Salaried Savings
Plan.
12.

Defendant

is ordered

to pay

the

outstanding

bill

for

repair of the 1980 Blazer automobile due and payable to Sillitoe
Repair—Shop in the amount of $126.56 and the amount due and owing
Marjorie Young .out of the $2,550.12 remaining of the tax refund
which is held by Defendant in his checking account. The balance of
that refund should be divided equally between the parties.
13.

The following items of personal property shall be sold and

the proceeds divided equally between the parties:
(1).

A 1977 Swinger motor home.

(2).

The 1988 Jaguar automobile.

(3).

The Piper Arrow Airplane.

(4) . The 1980 Blazer automobile.
14.

Defendant is permanently enjoined from any contact with

the Plaintiff

except by prior arrangement

in the presence of a

neutral third party agreeable to both parties.
15.

Plaintiff is ordered to allow Defendant to retrieve his

personal property, household goods and furnishings from the home at
1098

South Fir Street on December

presence of a neutral third party.

28, 29

and

30, 1992, in the

If Mrs. Marjorie Young is the

third party present at that time, then the parties should pay to her
out of the tax refund money held by the Defendant a fair hourly rate

-6-

in the $5.00 to $10.00 per hour range, to be negotiated directly
with

Mrs. Young.

If there

is

a dispute between

the parties

concerning any item of personal property which Defendant claims is
his, the Court reserves jurisdiction to resolve that dispute.
16.

Each party shall pay his or her own costs and attorney's

17.

Plaintiff is restored to her maiden name of Lynda Ann

fees.

Nehen.
DATED t h i s ,

Ffy
/ / /

day of fs&L
M/PJUAM}^

day of

, 1993.

BY THE (WURT:

^t^m^r
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Robert T. Braithwaite
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM
AND CONTENT:

Dale W. Sessions

MOTION
TO
SUPPLEMENT
FINDINGS AND ORDER
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FILZD
F l f - H DISTRICT 30URT

GALLIAN & WESTFALL
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #3434
Attorney for Defendant
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
P.O. Box 367
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 628-1682
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LYNDA SMITH,
I

Plaintiff

;I

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
FINDINGS AND ORDER

j

C i v i l No.

vs.
RICHARD RAYMOND, SMITH, SR.

Defendant

924500057

;

Defendant, by and through his attorney, G. Michael Westfall of
the law firm of GALLIAN & WESTFALL, hereby requests that the Court
supplement its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order,
as announced on December 10, 1992, as follows:
1.

Defendant requests that the Court enter a finding

acknowledging

as

the

Defendant's

premarital

property,

all

furnishings and premarital property he brought into the marriage,
including, but not limited to, the teak table, and teak sideboard,
piano, and the Defendant's jewelry which was in the Defendant's
jewelry box and left by the Defendant in the Blazer the last time
he parked the Blazer at the airport in May, 1992.
2.

Defendant moves the Court to supplement its Findings and

Notion to Supplement

Order to find that approximately $1,300.00 worth of jewelry was
removed from the Defendant's jewelry box left by Defendant in the
Blazer automobile at the airport in May, 1992, and that either the
Plaintiff or her son removed the Blazer automobile, containing the
jewelry box, from the airport, despite the fact that the Blazer was
to have been left there for the Defendant's use. The Court should
also find that the Defendant found the jewelry box, together with
a portion of its contents, in the home at 1098 South Fir Street,
during one of his visits there.

The Defendant further moves the

Court for entry of a legal conclusion that Plaintiff is responsible
for the loss of that property from the jewelry box and entry of an
Order that the Plaintiff reimburse the Defendant the sum of
$1,300.00 for the loss of his jewelry from the jewelry box.
3.

Defendant moves the Court for an entry of a finding that

the Plaintiff's son has damaged the Defendant's firearms since the
parties

have

separated

and while the

firearms were in the

Plaintiff's possession, and that the cost to restore those firearms
is $1,500.00.

Defendant further requests that the Court enter a

legal conclusion that Plaintiff is responsible for the damage to
the firearms and entry of an Order requiring that the Plaintiff
reimburse the Defendant in that amount for damage to his firearms.
4.

Defendant moves the Court for entry of an Order finding

that the Plaintiff should repay to the Defendant the sum of
$1,500.00 as approximately one-half of the approximately $3,000.00
which the Plaintiff claims was stolen from the home at 1098 South
Fir Street, on or about the 8th day of June, 1992.
Motion to Supplement
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5.

Defendant further moves the Court for entry of a finding

that when the Defendant's premarital home was sold the proceeds
were used to pay the down payment on the home at 1098 South Fir
Street, to purchase the Jacuzzi, and to pay the parties' moving
expenses and all of the mortgage payments on the home at 1098 South
Fir Street have been paid with the Defendant's premarital Air Force
retirement.
6.

Defendant further moves the Court for entry of a finding

that the VISA credit card debt incurred to pay travel expenses,
including fuel for the airplane, at least prior to the parties'
separation, is a debt of the Sportsmen's Lounge and should be paid
by income generated from the Lounge and/or the proceeds of sale of
the Lounge before the proceeds of sale are divided between the
parties and also moves the Court for entry of an order requiring
Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant one-half of the First Security
cash reserve debt which had been paid by Defendant since these
proceedings were initiated.
7.

Defendant further moves the Court for entry of an

order

requiring that the Plaintiff return to the Defendant or allow the
Defendant to retrieve the following items of personal property some
of 'which the Plaintiff refused to allow Defendant to take with him
on December 29th, and some of which the Defendant was unable to
remove from the premises at that time:

(1)

Coffee maker,

(2)

Blender,

(3)

Toaster,
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(4)

Pots and pans,

(5)

Refrigerator,

(6)

Freezer,

(7)

25" color TV,

(8)

Waterbed,

(9)

Movie camera (Camcorder)

(10) Vacuum cleaner,
(11) One-half of the towels, linens, bedding, pillows,
blankets, etc.
(12)

Washer and dryer,

(13)

Ironing board and iron,

(14)

Aluminum boat,

(15)

Ski boat and trailer,

(16)

V12 engine,

(17)

870 shot gun,

(18)

Gun cleaning kits,

(19)

Hunting clothes, gloves, hats, etc.

(20)

Ski jacket, scarfs, etc.

DATED this

Motion to Supplement

/ ^ ~ day of (

tifou^

4

,1993.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copv of the
foregoing document, postage prepaid, this Jd^
day of CVn^7 /
1993, to the following:
**
(J
Dale Sessions, Esq.
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
250 South Main
Cedar City, UT 84720
\UuLA^.^)
Secretary

HQJ\i

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION BY FACSIMILIE
I hereby certify that I sent by facsimilie a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, this 13*^ day
of Q&s+J
, 1993, to the following:

2

Dale Sessions, Esq.
FAX NO: 586-1002

<7\ M ^ u v ^ yL]&-h city
Secretary
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DALE W. SESSIONS [5793]
CHAMBERLAIN & fflGBEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
250 South Main
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, UT 84721-0726
(801) 586-4404
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LYNDA ANN SMITH,

]

Plaintiff,

]I

VS.

ORDER

J

RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR.,
Defendants.

]
1
])

Civil No. 924500057DA
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

This matter came on regularly for hearing on various post-judgment motions filed by both
counsel on Thursday, February 25, 1993 at 1:30 p.m. with the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite
presiding.

Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel, Dale W. Sessions of

Chamberlain & Higbee. Defendant was present and was represented by G. Michael Westfall
of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox. The Court, having reviewed the file, having heard the testimony
and being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Motions to Settle Final Documents and/or Adopt Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law filed by both counsel are now moot based on the Court's earlier rulings.

2.

With respect to Plaintiffs Motion to Settle Final Documents and Clarify Terms

and Conditions the Court orders as follows:
(a)

Regarding Paragraph 1, Defendant is to pick up any personal property items

remaining in Plaintiffs possession on March 13 and 14, 1993. Defendant is to be permitted
access to the marital residence between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. During the times
Defendant is to be in the residence, a police officer will be present. If Defendant is to be
detained or late, a courtesy call to the police informing them of such is to be made by
Defendant. Mr. Westfall is to make arrangements with the Police Department to comply with
this Order.
(b)

Regarding Paragraph 2, the relief requested is moot because the Findings of Fact

and the Conclusions of Law have been adopted by the Court,
(c)

Regarding Paragraph 3, the Court reserves the issue of the proceeds from the

VFW building, the Court takes that issue under advisement.
As to the issues of termites in the Bar, the Court orders that Plaintiffs attorney contact
the person at Alpine Pest Control who is in charge of termite eradication requesting him to write
a letter to the Court [Judge Braithwaite] setting out his recommendations and send a copy of that
letter to both attorneys. The treatment for the termite infestation is to be carried out according
to the recommendation of Alpine Pest Control subject to further order of the Court. Fifteen
days after the letter from Alpine Pest Control is mailed to the Court, either side can produce a
bid for less expensive service.
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As to the issue of property taxes, the Court takes no action on the tax issue at this time
because the property is not under threat of tax sale.
3.

Defendant's Motion to Supplement Findings and Order. The Court orders as

follows:
(a)

The Court orders that the teak table, teak sideboard, piano and jewelry which have

been picked up by the Defendant are to be the Defendant's property.
(b)

Regarding Paragraph 2 of Defendant's Motion, the disposition of this paragraph

is addressed in Findings and Decree.
(c)

Regarding

Paragraph 3 of Defendant's Motion, the Court denies the relief

requested.
(d)

Regarding Paragraph 4 of Defendant's Motion, the Court denies the relief

requested on the basis that both parties have been harmed equally.
(e)

Regarding Paragraph 5 of Defendant's Motion, by way of clarification, the Court

has previously entered findings that proceeds were commingled. Since this issue has already
been addressed in the Findings, Conclusions and Decree, it will not be addressed further.
(f)

Regarding Paragraph 6 of Defendant's Motion, the Court denies the relief

requested.
(g)

Regarding Paragraph 7 of Defendant's Motion, Defendant is ordered to retrieve

the following items from Plaintiffs residence on March 13 and 14, 1993 as set out previously
herein, to wit: Coffee maker, blender, toaster, pots and pans, refrigerator, freezer, 25" color
TV, waterbed, camcorder, washer and dryer, one (1) vacuum cleaner, aluminum boat, V-12
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engine, ski boat and trailer, gun cleaning kits, hunting clothes, gloves, hats, etc., and ski jacket,
scarfs, etc., and the 870 shotgun, if/when it is located. What linens, towels, etc. Defendant has
in his possession on February 25, 1993 are to remain in his possession.
4.

Defendant's Motion for Rehearing on Issue of Temporary Restraining Order and

Disposition of Airplane:
(a)

Regarding Paragraph 1 of Defendant's Motion, the Court denies the relief

requested in Paragraph 1.
(b)

Regarding Paragraph 2 of Defendant's Motion, the Court orders a 60-day cutoff

for the sale of the airplane. The airplane is to be sold to highest bidder either, found by Plaintiff
or Defendant. If there is a profit, the parties will share in the profit. If it is sold at a loss, the
parties will share in the loss. The Court orders Defendant to pay the hangar costs, and that
hanger costs from December 10, 1992 forward are to be shared equally upon sale, as will
insurance costs.
5.

Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt and Order to Show Cause:

(a)

Regarding Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Motion, the Court hereby orders that the

bank or credit union (Lockheed) provide copies of the account status and whatever financial
information they have on this account for the months of November, 1992, December, 1992 and
January, 1993, and to provide such to both Plaintiff and Defendant at their respective residences.
Either Plaintiff or Defendant can bring those issues back before the Court.
(b)

Because Defendant has made no payment of Plaintiffs portion of the 1991 IRS

refund, the CourtfindsDefendant in contempt. Rather than impose jail time or a fine, the Court
hereby orders Defendant to pay Plaintiffs attorneys fees for the entire proceedings of this date.
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The Court limits the amount of attorney fees to a reasonable amount and Plaintiffs counsel, Mr.
Sessions, is ordered to prepare what he claims for preparation for the proceedings on February
25, 1993 with a copy of his summary submitted to the Court and to Defendant's attorney. If
necessary, further hearing will be held,
(c)

Since Defendant did not pay Mr. Sillitoe as previously ordered and did not pay

Mrs. Young, he is ordered to pay $40.00 to Plaintiff as reimbursement for Mrs. Young's
expenses and $63.49, which is one-half the amount of the Sillitoe bill which has been paid by
Plaintiff.
(d)

Defendant is ordered to pay $20.15 to Plaintiff for long-distance telephone calls

made and charged to Plaintiffs telephone bill.
(e)

Defendant is ordered to take every effort to obtain the retirement computations

to compute Plaintiffs portion. Defendant is ordered to provide the information to the Court on
or before May 1, 1993. If an amount is not obtained by that date, the Court may arbitrarily set
an amount.
(0

The Court orders that all personal property items that were ordered sold in the

Decree are to be sold on or before May 1, 1993 and the proceeds divided. If the items have not
been sold at that time, the Court may order reverse possession. The Court intends that this
would mean taking everything that Defendant has in his possession that needs to be sold and give
it to Plaintiff to sell and everything Plaintiff has in her possession that needs to be sold will be
given to Defendant to sell. If that is not accomplished after 60 days, the Court may enter
further orders.
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(g)

As to the Sportsman's Lounge and home, the Court orders no further real estate

listing to be made without Court approval. The parties may submit an application for listing buy
stipulation.
DATED this S?l

day of March, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

'T^dBRiATrir^jArrE
District Court Judge
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Addendum Item Number 5

IN THE FIFTH'JUDICIAL"'DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
SMITH, LYNDA ANN
PLAINTIFF
VS
SMITH, RICHARD RAYMOND,SR;
DEFENDANT,

CASE NUMBER 924500057 DA
DATE 05/21/92
HONORABLE ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE \V vV
COURT REPORTER 1-5-99 (3533-END)'**COURT CLERK KDP

\T

v
TYPE OF HEARING:
ORDER TO .-.SHOW CAUSE
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT

xv

P. ATTY. SE§SJLQNS-^_DALE__W___^
D. ATTYw^WESTFALL, G MICHAEL"

FOLLOWING ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL PARTIES STIPULATE THAT THE
MUTUAL RESTRAINING ORDER REMAIN IN EFFECT DURING THE PENDENCY
OF THESE PROCEEDINGS. 1)PLAINTIFF IS TO REMAIN IN THE MARITAL
HOME WITH TEMPORARY SUPPORT OF $1,000 A MONTH. 2)THE DEFENDANT I
TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE ACCOUNTING AND INVENTORY RECORDS OF THE
BUSINESS THRU THE ACCOUNTANT. IF A QUESTIONS ARISES HE CAN
PETITION THE COURT AT ANY TIME FOR A CHANGE IN THE ARRANGEMENT.
3)A THIRD PARTY CAN MONITOR THE BUSINESS ON BANDNIGHT AND REPORT
TO THE DEFENDANT. 4)BOTH PARTIES ARE RESTRAINED FROM DISPOSING,
WASTING, OR HARMING MARITIAL AND PREMARITAL ASSETS PENDING
FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT." 5)DEFENDANT TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE
HOME TO OBTAIN DOCUMENTS IN THE COMPANY OF AN OFFICER. 6) MR.
SMITH IS TO HAVE THE USE OF THE JAGUARS DURING THE PENDENCY
OF THESE PROCEEDINGS. 7)MRS. SMITH IS TO DRAW NO FUNDS FROM THE
BUSINESS. THEY ARE TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR IN FULL. 8)THE PARITIES
INCOME TAX REFUND IS TO BE USED FOR BUSINESS EXPENSES. 9)COURT
RESERVED RULING ON ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS FEES. MR. SESSIONS WILL
PREPARE THE ORDER.
***
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